

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34

No effect of monetary reward in a visual working memory task

Ronald van den Berg^{1,2}, Qijia Zou³, Wei Ji Ma^{3,4}

¹Department of Psychology, University of Uppsala, von Kraemers allé 1E, Uppsala, Sweden

²Department of Psychology, University of Stockholm, Frescati Hagväg 9A, Stockholm, Sweden

³Department of Psychology, New York University, 6 Washington Place, New York, NY, USA

⁴Center for Neural Science, New York University, 4 Washington Place, New York, NY, USA

ABSTRACT

Previous work has shown that humans distribute their visual working memory (VWM) resources flexibly across items: the higher the importance of an item, the better it is remembered. A related, but much less studied question is whether people also have control over the *total* amount of VWM resource allocated to a task. Here, we approach this question by testing whether increasing monetary incentives results in better overall VWM performance. In two experiments, subjects performed a delayed-estimation task on the Amazon Turk platform. In both experiments, four groups of subjects received a bonus payment based on their performance, with the maximum bonus ranging from \$0 to \$10 between groups. We found no effect of the amount of bonus on intrinsic motivation or on VWM performance in either experiment. These results suggest that resource allocation in visual working memory is insensitive to monetary reward, which has implications for resource-rational theories of VWM.

INTRODUCTION

A central question in research on human visual working memory (VWM) is how much flexibility exists in how the system distributes its resource across encoded items (Luck & Vogel, 2013; Ma, Husain, & Bays, 2014). The answer to this question partly depends on how one conceptualizes the nature of VWM resource. One class of models postulates that VWM consists of a small number of “slots” that each provide an indivisible amount of encoding resource (e.g., (Awh, Barton, & Vogel, 2007; Cowan, 2001; Luck & Vogel, 1997; Rouder et al., 2008; Zhang & Luck, 2008)). Since the number of slots is typically assumed to be very small (3 to 4), these models allow for virtually no flexibility in resource allocation. A competing class of models conceptualizes VWM as a continuous resource (e.g., (Bays & Husain, 2008; Fougine, Suchow,

35 & Alvarez, 2012; Keshvari, van den Berg, & Ma, 2013; Shaw, 1980; van den Berg, Shin, Chou,
36 George, & Ma, 2012; Wilken & Ma, 2004)), sometimes in combination with a limit on the
37 number of encoded items (Sims, Jacobs, & Knill, 2012; van den Berg, Awh, & Ma, 2014).
38 Since a continuous resource can be divided into arbitrarily small packages, these models allow
39 for a high degree of flexibility in resource allocation.

40 Several recent studies have found evidence for flexibility in VWM resource allocation.
41 First, it has been found in multiple experiments that when one item in a stimulus array is more
42 likely to be selected for test than other items, subjects remember this item with better precision
43 (Bays, 2014; Bays, Gorgoraptis, Wee, Marshall, & Husain, 2011; Emrich, Lockhart, & Al-
44 Aidroos, 2017; Gorgoraptis, Catalao, Bays, & Husain, 2011; Yoo, Klyszejko, Curtis, & Ma,
45 2018; Zokaei, Gorgoraptis, Bahrami, Bays, & Husain, 2011). In addition, it has been reported
46 that subjects can make a tradeoff between the number of items in VWM and the quality with
47 which they are encoded (Fougnie, Cormiea, Kanabar, & Alvarez, 2016; however see Zhang &
48 Luck, 2011). The kind of flexibility found in these studies typically improves task performance
49 compared to what can be achieved using a fixed allocation strategy, which suggests that the
50 allocation is driven by a rational policy.

51 We recently formalized this suggestion by modeling VWM as a rational system that
52 balances the amount of invested resource against expected task performance: the more there is
53 at stake, the more resource is allocated for encoding (van den Berg & Ma, 2018). This
54 “resource-rational” interpretation of VWM predicts two kinds of flexibility in the allocation of
55 VWM resource. First, items of unequal importance are assigned unequal amounts of encoding
56 resource, which is consistent with the findings cited above. Second, *tasks* of unequal importance
57 are assigned unequal amounts of *total* resource: the higher the incentive to perform well on a
58 task, the more VWM resource a subject should be willing to invest. In support of the second
59 kind of flexibility, it has been found that subjects who are encouraged to “try to remember all
60 items” in a change detection task have higher estimated numbers of slots than subjects who are
61 told to “just do your best” or to “focus on a subset” (Bengson & Luck, 2016). Moreover, in one
62 of our own studies, we observed that the estimated total amount of invested VWM resource in
63 delayed-estimation tasks often varies non-monotonically with set size, in a way that can be
64 explained by a resource-rational model (van den Berg & Ma, 2018). Finally, it has been reported
65 that cueing can increase net VWM capacity (Myers, Chekroud, Stokes, & Nobre, 2018).

66 In the present study, we examine whether the total amount of allocated VWM resource
67 is affected by monetary reward. We performed two experiments in which subjects earned a
68 performance-contingent monetary bonus on top of a base payment. When encoding is costly, a

69 rational observer should adjust its total amount of invested VWM resource to the amount of
70 performance-contingent bonus: the higher the potential bonus, the more effort should be put
71 into the task. In both experiments, we found no evidence for such an effect. In opposition to the
72 prediction following from a resource-rational theory of VWM (van den Berg & Ma, 2018), the
73 present results suggest that VWM resource allocation is insensitive to monetary reward.

74

75 **EXPERIMENT 1**

76

77 **Data and code availability**

78 All data, Matlab analysis scripts to reproduce figures of results, and JASP files with statistical
79 analyses are available at <https://osf.io/mwz27/>.

80

81 **Recruitment**

82 Subjects were recruited on the Amazon Mechanical Turk platform, where the experiment was
83 posted as a “Human Intelligence Task”. The experiment was visible only to subjects who were
84 located in the USA, had not participated in the experiment before, and had an approval rate of
85 95% or higher. A total of 355 subjects signed up, of which 156 were disqualified due to failing
86 the post-instruction quiz (see below). The remaining 199 subjects were randomly assigned to
87 four groups ($n=49, 47, 47, 46$) that differed in the total amount of bonus they could earn by
88 performing well (\$0, \$2, \$6, \$10). Besides the bonus, subjects received a \$1 base payment. The
89 experiment was approved by the Institutional Review Board of New York University.

90

91 **Stimuli and task**

92 On each trial, the subject was presented with 1, 2, 4, 6, or 8 Gabor patches, which were placed
93 along an invisible circle around a central fixation point (Fig. 1A). We refer to the number of
94 presented items as the set size, which varied from trial to trial in a pseudo-random manner. The
95 orientation of each patch was drawn independently from a uniform distribution over all possible
96 orientations. The stimulus appeared for 50 milliseconds and was followed by an empty screen
97 with a duration of 1 second (memory period). Thereafter, a randomly oriented Gabor patch
98 appeared at one of the previous stimulus locations, whose initial orientation was randomly
99 drawn and could be adjusted through mouse movement. The task was to match the orientation
100 of this probe stimulus with the remembered orientation at that location. After submitting the
101 response, the error between the correct orientation and the reported orientation, ϵ , was converted
102 into an integer score between 0 and 10, with more points assigned for smaller errors (see

103 Appendix for a visualization of the scoring function). Feedback was provided after each trial
104 by showing the obtained score and two lines that corresponded to the correct and responded
105 orientations.
106




Figure 1 | Experimental procedure. (A) Illustration of a single trial in Experiment 1 (not to scale). Subjects were briefly presented with 1, 2, 4, 6, or 8 Gabor patches, which they had to keep in memory during the delay period. Thereafter, a randomly oriented Gabor patch would appear at one of the previous stimulus locations. The task was to match the orientation of this stimulus with the remembered orientation of the stimulus that had appeared earlier at this location. The procedure in Experiment 2 was the same, except that no feedback was shown. (B) Instructions provided to the subjects in Experiment 1.

107

108

109 Procedure

110 At the start of the experiment, subjects received written instructions about the task and about
111 how their performance would be scored (Fig. 1B). Next, they were informed about the bonus
112 payment. For a subject in the condition with a maximum bonus of \$10, the text in this screen
113 would read “*You will receive \$1 for each point you get on a trial. For example, if your highest
114 score among the three trials is 7 points, then your actual bonus is \$7. You will not receive any
115 bonus if you get 0 points!*”. Thereafter, they performed 15 practice trials that were identical to
116 trials in the actual experiment. After finishing these trials, a multiple-choice quiz was presented
117 with three questions to test the subject’s understanding of the task and the potential bonus
118 payment. Subjects who failed on at least one of these questions were disqualified from the
119 experiment. The remaining subjects performed 250 trials of the delayed-estimated task with the
120 five set sizes pseudo-randomly intermixed. To check if subjects were paying attention, we asked
121 them at three points in the experiment to press the space bar within 4 seconds. Subjects who at

122 least once failed to do this were presumably not paying attention and were therefore excluded
123 from the analyses.

124

125 **Results**

126 Data from 10 subjects were excluded from the analyses because they failed to respond to at
127 least one of the three attention-checking questions. Of the remaining 189 subjects, another 35
128 were excluded because they had response error distributions that did not significantly differ
129 from a uniform distribution, as assessed by a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test with a significance
130 level of 0.05. For the remaining 154 subjects, we computed the circular variance of the response
131 error distribution at each set size (Fig. 2A, left). We performed a Bayesian Repeated-Measures
132 ANOVA (JASP Team, 2018; Rouder, Morey, Speckman, & Province, 2012) on these measures,
133 with set size as a within-subjects factor and bonus size as a between-subjects factor. The results
134 indicated extremely strong evidence for a main effect of set size ($BF_{incl}=\infty$), but evidence
135 *against* a main effect of bonus size $BF_{incl}=0.048^1$.

136

137 **Discussion**

138 The results of Experiment 1 showed no evidence of an effect of performance-contingent reward
139 on VWM performance. One possible explanation of this null result is that resource allocation
140 in VWM is insensitive to monetary reward. However, there are at least two factors in the
141 experimental design that may have interfered with the reward manipulation. First, subjects
142 received trial-to-trial feedback. Being constantly confronted with their own performance may
143 have motivated them to perform as well as possible regardless of the amount of bonus they
144 could earn. Second, since the bonus was mentioned only at the beginning of the experiment,
145 subjects may have performed the task without having the bonus strongly on their minds. To
146 address these potential confounds, we ran a second experiment in which subjects did not receive
147 trial-to-trial feedback and were reminded regularly of the bonus.

148

¹ BF_{incl} quantifies how likely the data are under the models that include a main or interaction effect relative to how likely they are under models that do not include this effect. For example, $BF_{incl}=0.048$ for a main effect of bonus size indicates that the data are $1/0.048 \approx 20.8$ times more likely under the models that do not include this main effect compared to models that do include it.




Figure 2 | Effect of bonus on VWM performance and motivation scores. (A) Subject-averaged circular variance of the estimation error distribution as a function of the amount of potential bonus in Experiments 1 (left) and 2 (right). (B) Intrinsic Motivation Inventory scores as a function of the amount of potential bonus, split by item category. Error bars indicate 1 s.e.m.

149

150

151 EXPERIMENT 2

152

153 Recruitment

154 A new cohort of subjects was recruited on the Amazon Mechanical Turk platform. The
 155 experiment was visible only to subjects who were located in the USA, had not participated in
 156 the experiment before, and had an approval rate of 95% or higher. A total of 241 subjects signed
 157 up, of whom 41 were disqualified due to failing the post-instruction quiz. The remaining 200
 158 subjects were randomly assigned to four groups ($n=52, 48, 50, 50$) that again differed in the
 159 amount of potential bonus payment. The base payment was \$5 and the potential bonus amounts
 160 were \$0.50, \$1, \$2, and \$4. The experiment was approved by the Institutional Review Board of
 161 New York University.

162

163 Stimuli and procedure

164 The stimuli and procedure for Experiment 2 were identical to Experiment 1, except for the
 165 following differences. First, subjects were reminded of the bonus four times in the instruction
 166 screen (compared to only once in Experiment 1) and during the task itself the following message
 167 appeared after every 50 trials: “*You have completed X% of the Experiment. Remember that you*
 168 *have the chance to earn a \$Y bonus!*”, where X and Y were determined by the number of
 169 completed trials and the amount of bonus, respectively. Second, no performance feedback was
 170 given, neither during practice nor during the actual experiment. Third, the length of the practice
 171 phase was reduced to 10 trials, but three “walk-through trials” were added at the start in which
 172 subjects were fully guided with additional written instructions. Lastly, after the experiment,

173 subjects filled out 20 questions from the Intrinsic Motivation Inventory (McAuley, Duncan, &
174 Tammen, 1989; Ryan, 1982) which related to their “Interest”, “Perceived choice”, and
175 “Perceived competence” in the task. They rated these items on a Likert scale from 1 (“not at all
176 true”) to 7 (“very true”). The full questionnaire can be found at <https://osf.io/mwz27>.

177

178 **Results**

179 Data from 27 subjects were excluded because they failed to respond to one of the attention-
180 checking questions (9 subjects) or had a response error distribution that did not significantly
181 differ from a uniform distribution according to a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (18 subjects). We
182 performed the same statistical analyses as in Experiment 1 on the data from the remaining 173
183 subjects (Fig. 2A, right). Again, we found extremely strong evidence for a main effect of set
184 size ($BF_{\text{incl}}=\infty$) and evidence *against* a main effect of bonus size ($BF_{\text{incl}}=0.34$). Hence, it seems
185 unlikely that the absence of an effect in Experiment 1 was due to subjects being unaware of the
186 potential bonus payment or due to presence of trial-to-trial feedback.

187 Next, we assessed whether bonus size affected the subjects’ scores on the intrinsic
188 motivation inventory questions (Fig. 2B). Using Bayesian one-way ANOVAs, we found that
189 there was no effect in any of the three categories: $BF_{10}=0.275$ for mean “interest” scores,
190 $BF_{10}=0.174$ for mean “perceived competence” scores, and $BF_{10}=0.034$ for mean “perceived
191 choice” scores. Nevertheless, we noticed that there was considerable variation in the intrinsic
192 motivation scores across subjects, especially in the “Interest” and “Perceived competence”
193 categories (Fig. 3A). Therefore, we next tested if there was an effect of motivation scores on
194 VWM performance. To this end, we grouped subjects from Experiment 2 into “low motivation”
195 and “high motivation” subgroups by using a median split on each of the three categories of the
196 Intrinsic Motivation Inventory (Fig. 3B). To examine whether scores in any of the three
197 categories is predictive of VWM performance, we performed a repeated-measures Bayesian
198 ANOVA with set size as within-subjects factor and motivation score (“low” and “high”) as a
199 between-subjects factor. All three tests provided evidence for the null hypothesis that there was
200 no performance difference between subjects in the low and high motivation subgroups (Interest:
201 $BF_{\text{incl}}=0.12$; Perceived competence: $BF_{\text{incl}}=0.21$; Perceived choice: $BF_{\text{incl}}=0.21$).

202

203




Figure 3 | Comparison of VWM performance between subjects with low and high scores on the Intrinsic Motivation Inventory (IMI). (A) Distribution of average IMI scores, split by question category. (B) Circular variance of the response error plotted separately for subjects with below-median and above-median scores on the IMI questionnaire.

204

205

206 Discussion

207 The aim of Experiment 2 was to test whether the null effect from Experiment 1 persists if we
 208 remove trial-by-trial feedback and remind subjects more often of the potential bonus. We found
 209 that this was not the case: again, there was no effect of monetary reward on VWM performance.
 210 This further strengthens the hypotheses that VWM resource allocation is independent of
 211 monetary reward. We also found that intrinsic motivation does not depend on the amount of
 212 monetary reward. This suggests that our current results are limited to the domain of *external*
 213 motivation and leave open the possibility that VWM resource allocation may be sensitive to
 214 manipulations of *intrinsic* motivation.

215

216 GENERAL DISCUSSION

217 In two experiments, we found no evidence that VWM resource allocation depends on
 218 performance-contingent monetary reward. We consider multiple possible explanations for this
 219 finding. First, it may be that VWM uses a fixed amount of resource, independent of the task at
 220 hand. However, this explanation contradicts previous evidence suggesting that the amount of

221 allocated resource depends on task instructions (Bengson & Luck, 2016), set size (van den Berg
222 & Ma, 2018), and cueing condition (Myers et al., 2018). Moreover, this kind of rigidity would
223 stand in stark contrast to the flexibility with which VWM resource is divided among items
224 within a trial when items have varying importance (Bays, 2014; Bays et al., 2011; Emrich et
225 al., 2017; Gorgoraptis et al., 2011; Yoo et al., 2018; Zokaei et al., 2011). A second possible
226 explanation for the null effects is that the bonuses may have been too small to cause an effect.
227 We believe this to be unlikely too, especially in Experiment 1, where the bonus could increase
228 the earnings in one of the groups by a factor 11 (\$10 bonus in addition to \$1 base payment).
229 Third, subjects might not have had the bonus strongly enough on their minds when performing
230 the task. While this explanation could be plausible in Experiment 1 – where subjects were
231 informed about the bonus only at the very beginning of the experiment – it seems implausible
232 in Experiment 2, where they were regularly reminded of it. Fourth, it may be that bonus
233 manipulations are only effective when they are administered on a trial-by-trial basis, as
234 suggested by an earlier study on the relation between task preparation and reward (Shen &
235 Chun, 2011). Fifth, we may inadvertently have biased our subject sample to “over-performers”,
236 by only recruiting subjects who had a high approval rate on the Amazon Turk. The desire to
237 maintain a high approval rate may have worked as a strong incentive for these subjects to
238 perform well, regardless of the amount of performance-related bonus they could earn.

239 Altogether, the currently available evidence on the relation between motivation and
240 VWM performance remains slim and mixed, which would make any strong conclusion
241 premature. One important direction for future research would be to use a within-subject design
242 that test effects of trial-by-trial variations in monetary reward. Another interesting direction
243 would be to test for effects of intrinsic motivation on VWM performance, for example by
244 “gamifying” the experiment (Hamari, Koivisto, & Sarsa, 2014). Finally, it would be worthwhile
245 to examine whether subjects recruited on the Amazon Mechanical Turk platform are generally
246 “over-performers”, because this would have important implications for studies that examine
247 effects of motivation on human behavior.

248

249 **ACKNOWLEDGMENTS**

250 This research was supported by grant 2018-01947 from the Swedish Research Council to
251 R.v.d.B, training grant R90DA043849-03 to Q.Z., and grant R01EY020958-09 to W.J.M.

252

253 **REFERENCES**

254 Awh, E., Barton, B., & Vogel, E. K. (2007). Visual working memory represents a fixed

- 255 number of items regardless of complexity. *Psychological Science*.
256 <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01949.x>
- 257 Bays, P. M. (2014). Noise in neural populations accounts for errors in working memory. *The*
258 *Journal of Neuroscience : The Official Journal of the Society for Neuroscience*, 34(10),
259 3632–3645. <https://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.3204-13.2014>
- 260 Bays, P. M., Gorgoraptis, N., Wee, N., Marshall, L., & Husain, M. (2011). Temporal
261 dynamics of encoding, storage, and reallocation of visual working memory. *Journal of*
262 *Vision*. <https://doi.org/10.1167/11.10.6>
- 263 Bays, P. M., & Husain, M. (2008). Dynamic shifts of limited working memory resources in
264 human vision. *Science*, 321(5890), 851–854. <https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1158023>
- 265 Bengson, J. J., & Luck, S. J. (2016). Effects of strategy on visual working memory capacity.
266 *Psychonomic Bulletin and Review*. <https://doi.org/10.3758/s13423-015-0891-7>
- 267 Cowan, N. (2001). The magical number 4 in short-term memory: A reconsideration of mental
268 storage capacity. *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*.
269 <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X01003922>
- 270 Emrich, S. M., Lockhart, H. A., & Al-Aidroos, N. (2017). Attention mediates the flexible
271 allocation of visual working memory resources. *Journal of Experimental Psychology:*
272 *Human Perception and Performance*, 43(7), 1454–1465.
273 <https://doi.org/10.1037/xhp0000398>
- 274 Fougnie, D., Cormiea, S. M., Kanabar, A., & Alvarez, G. A. (2016). Strategic trade-offs
275 between quantity and quality in working memory. *Journal of Experimental Psychology:*
276 *Human Perception and Performance*, 42(8), 1231–1240.
277 <https://doi.org/10.1037/xhp0000211>
- 278 Fougnie, D., Suchow, J. W., & Alvarez, G. A. (2012). Variability in the quality of visual
279 working memory. *Nature Communications*, 3, 1229.
280 <https://doi.org/10.1038/ncomms2237>
- 281 Gorgoraptis, N., Catalao, R. F. G., Bays, P. M., & Husain, M. (2011). Dynamic Updating of
282 Working Memory Resources for Visual Objects. *Journal of Neuroscience*.
283 <https://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.0208-11.2011>

- 284 Hamari, J., Koivisto, J., & Sarsa, H. (2014). Does gamification work? - A literature review of
285 empirical studies on gamification. In *Proceedings of the Annual Hawaii International*
286 *Conference on System Sciences*. <https://doi.org/10.1109/HICSS.2014.377>
- 287 JASP Team. (2018). JASP (Version 0.8.4.0) [Computer program].
- 288 Keshvari, S., van den Berg, R., & Ma, W. J. (2013). No Evidence for an Item Limit in Change
289 Detection. *PLoS Computational Biology*, *9*(2).
- 290 Luck, S. J., & Vogel, E. K. (1997). The capacity of visual working memory for features and
291 conjunctions. *Nature*, *390*(6657), 279–281. <https://doi.org/10.1038/36846>
- 292 Luck, S. J., & Vogel, E. K. (2013). Visual working memory capacity: From psychophysics
293 and neurobiology to individual differences. *Trends in Cognitive Sciences*, *17*(8), 391–
294 400. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2013.06.006>
- 295 Ma, W. J., Husain, M., & Bays, P. M. (2014). Changing concepts of working memory. *Nature*
296 *Neuroscience*, *17*(3), 347–356. <https://doi.org/10.1038/nn.3655>
- 297 McAuley, E., Duncan, T., & Tammen, V. V. (1989). Psychometric Properties of the Intrinsic
298 Motivation Inventory in a Competitive Sport Setting: A Confirmatory Factor Analysis.
299 *Research Quarterly for Exercise and Sport*, *60*(1), 48–58.
300 <https://doi.org/10.1080/02701367.1989.10607413>
- 301 Myers, N. E., Chekroud, S. R., Stokes, M. G., & Nobre, A. C. (2018). Benefits of flexible
302 prioritization in working memory can arise without costs. *Journal of Experimental*
303 *Psychology: Human Perception and Performance*. <https://doi.org/10.1037/xhp0000449>
- 304 Rouder, J. N., Morey, R. D., Cowan, N., Zwilling, C. E., Morey, C. C., & Pratte, M. S.
305 (2008). An assessment of fixed-capacity models of visual working memory. *Proceedings*
306 *of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America*, *105*(16), 5975–
307 5979. <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0711295105>
- 308 Rouder, J. N., Morey, R. D., Speckman, P. L., & Province, J. M. (2012). Default Bayes
309 factors for ANOVA designs. *Journal of Mathematical Psychology*, *56*(5), 356–374.
310 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmp.2012.08.001>
- 311 Ryan, R. M. (1982). Control and information in the intrapersonal sphere: An extension of
312 cognitive evaluation theory. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*.

- 313 <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.43.3.450>
- 314 Shaw, M. L. (1980). Identifying attentional and decision-making components in information
315 processing. In R. S. Nickerson (Ed.), *Attention and performance VIII* (pp. 277–296).
316 Hillsdale, NJ, NJ: Erlbaum.
- 317 Shen, Y. J., & Chun, M. M. (2011). Increases in rewards promote flexible behavior. *Attention,*
318 *Perception, and Psychophysics*. <https://doi.org/10.3758/s13414-010-0065-7>
- 319 Sims, C. R., Jacobs, R. A., & Knill, D. C. (2012). An ideal observer analysis of visual
320 working memory. *Psychological Review*, *119*(4), 807–830.
321 <https://doi.org/10.1037/a0029856>
- 322 van den Berg, R., Awh, E., & Ma, W. J. (2014). Factorial comparison of working memory
323 models. *Psychological Review*, *121*(1), 124–149. <https://doi.org/10.1037/a0035234>
- 324 van den Berg, R., & Ma, W. J. (2018). A resource-rational theory of set size effects in visual
325 working memory. *ELife*, *7*(e34963). <https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.34963>
- 326 van den Berg, R., Shin, H., Chou, W.-C., George, R., & Ma, W. J. (2012). Variability in
327 encoding precision accounts for visual short-term memory limitations. *Proceedings of*
328 *the National Academy of Sciences*, *109*(22), 8780–8785.
329 <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1117465109>
- 330 Wilken, P., & Ma, W. J. (2004). A detection theory account of change detection. *Journal of*
331 *Vision*, *4*(12), 1120–1135. <https://doi.org/10.1167/4.12.11>
- 332 Yoo, A. H., Klyszejko, Z., Curtis, C. E., & Ma, W. J. (2018). Strategic allocation of working
333 memory resource. *Scientific Reports*. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-018-34282-1>
- 334 Zhang, W., & Luck, S. J. (2008). Discrete fixed-resolution representations in visual working
335 memory. *Nature*, *453*(7192), 233–235. <https://doi.org/10.1038/nature06860>
- 336 Zhang, W., & Luck, S. J. (2011). The number and quality of representations in working
337 memory. *Psychological Science*, *22*(11), 1434–1441.
338 <https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797611417006>
- 339 Zokaei, N., Gorgoraptis, N., Bahrami, B., Bays, P. M., & Husain, M. (2011). Precision of
340 working memory for visual motion sequences and transparent motion surfaces. *Journal*

341 *of Vision*. <https://doi.org/10.1167/11.14.2>

342

343 APPENDIX

344 Scoring functions

345 In both experiments, subjects received points on each trial based on the accuracy of their

346 estimate. In Experiment 1, errors were mapped to scores through the function $s = 10 \cdot e^{-\frac{\varepsilon^2}{800}}$,

347 where ε is the error in degree. The score was rounded to the nearest integer to obtain the number

348 of points (Fig A1, black). In Experiment 2, a highly similar function was used (Fig. A1, red).

349




Figure A1 | Functions used to map an estimation error to a score in Experiments 1 and 2.

350

351